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Abstract:   Despite the Genocide Convention in 1951 pledging to abolish all cruel  
and  unfair  forms  of  torture  and  death  to  innocent  civilians  for  
religious,  national  and ethnic  reasons,  there has  been an alarming  
denunciation from the international rules of genocide in recent years.  
In  the  light  of  the  recent  difficulties  experienced  by  the  people  of  
Zimbabwe under the Zanu-PF party, and Saddam Hussein’s trial and  
subsequent hanging for ‘crimes against humanity’ in December 2006, 
an increasingly pressing question must be asked: ‘what impact is the  
Genocide Convention having over 67 years after its ratification?’ This  
article provides a crucial examination of the history behind the laws  
on genocide and a detailed discussion of the current legal position of  
the  Genocide  Convention  in  today’s  international  arena.  A  critical  
debate  as  to  the  very  nature  of  genocide  also  aims  to  refresh  the  
severity  of  the  crime  in  our  minds.  What  distinguishes  the  act  of  
genocide from all other evil crimes in international law, and how do  
we deal with it in today’s international climate?
1. Introduction.
‘Genocide’ loosely signifies an act committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in 
part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Many definitions of genocide exist, 
including the following by  Chalk and Jonassohn: ‘genocide is a form of one-sided 
mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group.’1 The word 
itself was thought up by Dr. Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959) in his work Axis Rule in  
Occupied Europe.2 Genocidal acts continue to be committed despite the introduction 
of a Genocide Convention,3 and the Courts and Tribunals which have jurisdiction over 
this crime have had to canvass the vague wording of the provisions themselves. But 
what  distinguishes  genocide  from  other  crimes,  and  are  we  dealing  with  it 
successfully?
1 Chalk, F. & Jonassohn, K. (1990). ‘The History and Sociology of Genocide : Analyses and Case 
Studies.’ Yale University Press, at page 1.
2 ‘Genocide’ comes from the ancient Greek word ‘genos’ (tribe, race) and the Latin ‘cide’ (killing), 
from Lemkin, R. ‘Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government –  
Proposals for Redress.’ (1944), available from www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin
3 For example: the Korean war, the intertribal Burundi killings between the Tutsi and Hutu groups, the 
reported massacre of Ugandans during the rule of former President Idi Amin, the slaying of dissidents 
in Equatorial Africa after independence was secured from Spain in 1968, the killing of Cambodians 
during the reign of Pol Pot, the mass killings of members of the Muslim minority in Chad in 1979, and 
the deaths of 180,000 Kurds in Northern Iraq as part of Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign in the 
1980’s. This, of course, does not include the most recent examples of President Robert Mugabe’s 
violent Zanu-PF party, and (questionable) reluctance of the Burmese government to let aid into their 
country after the devastating Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.
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2. The development of genocide in international criminal law.
The idea that individuals can be personally liable for international crimes has been 
slow to develop. The International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo were 
ad hoc bodies to deal with the aftermath of World War II.4 The provisions of the 
Nuremberg Charter were affirmed by the General Assembly in 1946 in Resolution 
95(1).5 The International  Law Commission  (ILC) formulated  the following crimes 
under international criminal law: 
Principle 6:
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law: 
a) crimes against peace; b) war crimes; c) crimes against humanity.6
At  this  point,  genocide  was  embedded  within  crimes  against  humanity.  Lemkin 
proposed  an  offence  of  barbarity  in  1933.7 This  included  acts  of  economic 
extermination and brutal attacks on the dignity of individuals causing damage to the 
collectivity to which they belonged. His ground-breaking legislation proposed: 1) the 
punishment of acts aimed at destroying the life, bodily integrity, liberty, dignity and 
the economic existence of a racial, religious or social collectivity; 2) both instigators 
and accomplices to acts of barbarity carry the same punishment as the author; and 3) 
all perpetrators were to be prosecuted and punished independently of the place where 
the  act  was  committed  (this  was  keeping  in  line  with  the  principle  forum  loci  
deprehensionis or ‘universal repression’ based on the principle that an offender can be 
brought to justice in the place where he is apprehended because he is regarded as an 
enemy of the whole international community).8 Real efforts were made after World 
War II to develop substantive rules relating to crimes against the peace and security of 
mankind.9 On  December  13,  1946,  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly 
unanimously adopted Resolution 96(I), which condemned genocide as a crime under 
international  law  and  requested  that  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  draft  a 
convention.10 Lemkin noted that the only obstacle at this point was to draft provisions 
4 Under General Assembly Resolution 177 (II): paragraph (a) the International Law Commission was 
established in 1947 and was immediately directed to formulate principles of international law 
recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
5 ‘Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognised by the Charter of the Nüremberg 
Tribunal’, Resolution 95 (I) of the United Nations General Assembly, 11 December 1946. Available at 
www.icrc.org. 
6 Documented in the International Law Commission’s Report on ‘Principles of the Nuremberg  
Tribunal’, Yearbook of the I.L.C., 1950, Vol. II, at page 195.
7 Lemkin, R. ‘Acts Constituting a General Transnational Danger Considered as Offences Against the  
Law of Nations.’ (1933). Available from www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin
8 Taken from articles 1, 6 and 7 of Lemkin’s proposed legislation to the 5th Conference for the 
Unification of Penal Law, documented in Lemkin, R. (1933), Ibid.
9 Lemkin was especially pleased that genocide was included in the indictment of the major war 
criminals of the Nuremberg trials, implying that by inferring the natural right of existence for 
individuals, genocide is not only a crime against the rules of war, but a crime against humanity. See 
Lemkin, R. ‘American Scholar’ (1946) Vol. 15, No. 2, at pages 227 – 230.
10 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96(I) of 13 December 1946 claimed that genocide 
shocked the conscious of mankind, resulted in great losses to humanity…and was contrary to moral 
law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.  Resolution 96(I): ‘The Crime of Genocide’ 
available at www.un.org/documents.
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into criminal law formulae based upon the specific criminal intent to destroy entire 
human groups.11
     In  December  1948,  the  General  Assembly  adopted  the  Convention  on  the 
Prevention and Punishment  of the Crime of Genocide.12  This Convention largely 
incorporated Lemkin’s clearer proposals for an international treaty on genocide in his 
1946 work.13 The Convention came into force on January 12, 1951, and by January 
1985  there  were  96  ratifications.  It  was  assumed  that  trial  and  punishment  for 
genocide would take place within a domestic legal sphere, but recognition was given 
to  the  possibility  of  an  international  criminal  court.  The  Convention  affirms  the 
criminality  of  genocide  in  time  of  peace  as  well  as  in  time  of  war  (Article  1), 
distinguishing it from war crimes into a category of its own. Article 2 defines the 
offence:
Article 2:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such:
a) killing members of the group;
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) deliberately  inflicting  on the  group conditions  of  life  calculated  to  bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Persons committing conspiracy,  incitement, attempt and complicity to genocide are 
also punishable, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, 
or private individuals (Articles 3 and 4). Lemkin would have been particularly pleased 
with this, as he expressly encouraged equal liability for members of the government 
and political  bodies who gave and executed orders and incited the commission of 
genocide  by  whatever  means,  including  formulation  and  teaching  of  the  criminal 
philosophy of genocide.14 Article 5 states that the parties to the Convention are under 
an  obligation  to  enact  the  necessary  domestic  legislation  to  give  effect  to  the 
Convention and to provide effective penalties.15 The  Reservations to the Genocide  
Convention Report16 emphasised that the contracting States to the Convention do not 
have any interests of their own but a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of 
those higher purposes which are the raison d’etre of the convention.17
Practically, the treaty also prescribes the jurisdictional basis for possible prosecutions:
11 Lemkin, R. ‘Genocide as a Crime under International Law’ (1947) A.J.I.L. Vol. 41(1): 145-151.
12 78 UNTS 277 (1951). Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 
December 1948: United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 78, at page 277. Available from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/.
13 Lemkin, R. (1946) loc. cit. at f.n. 9.
14 Ibid.
15 To take the United Kingdom as an example, see the Genocide Act 1969. This provision keeps in line 
with Lemkin’s  forum loci deprehensionis or ‘universal repression’ idea, which he describes as ‘the 
symbol and practical application of the higher doctrine of moral and legal solidarity’ in his 1947 work 
Lemkin, (1947) loc. cit. at f.n. 11.
16 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports (1951).
17 Ibid., at para. 15.
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Article 6:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act  
was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction 
with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
This would now include the International Criminal Court if jurisdictional conditions 
are met; for example the State on whose territory the crime was committed or whose 
national is accused must be a party to the ICC Statute and make a declaration to this 
effect under Article 12 of the Statute.18 This may be a disadvantage for the growth of 
the  International  Criminal  Court.  In  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  v  Yugoslavia19 the 
International  Court  of  Justice  (I.C.J.)  emphasised  that  the  rights  and  obligations 
contained within the Genocide Convention were rights and obligations  erga omnes 
and that the obligation upon each state to prevent and punish the crime of genocide 
was  not  dependant  upon  the  type  of  conflict  involved  in  the  particular  situation 
(whether international or domestic) and was not territorially limited.20
     However, at enforcement level it is believed that the Convention has long proved a 
failure.21 It  was  1993  before  a  State  brought  a  case  of  genocide  before  the 
International  Court  of Justice22 and very few cases  have been brought  to national 
criminal courts.23 It is submitted however that this does not mean that the Convention 
does not work.
     The Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)24 came into force 
on 1 July 2002. This creates a criminal institution on an international basis and could 
potentially resolve many problems relating to the punishment of genocide. Lemkin 
highlighted the need for an adequate mechanism for international co-operation in the 
punishment of offenders.25 The Statute itself is a detailed treaty and firmly establishes 
genocide as an international crime. Domestic law now need not be the only avenue to 
prosecute such heinous individuals. Article 5 provides that the jurisdiction of the ICC 
is limited to ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole’ which are listed as (1) genocide; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) war crimes; 
and (4) the crime of aggression. The definition of genocide in Article 6 of the ICC 
Statute follows directly that of the Genocide Convention but in contrast, conspiracy, 
incitement, attempt, and complicity in genocide listed in Article 3 of the Genocide 
Convention have not been taken up by the ICC Statute. Could this be because the 
relevant  rules  are  already  laid  down  in  other  provisions  of  the  Statute? 
Disappointingly, the ICC has not yet delivered a genocide conviction.
     As a result of the mass killings in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990’s, two 
International Criminal Tribunals were established by the UN Security Council under 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The Statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former 
18 This precondition does not apply where the Security Council uses its powers under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter to refer a matter for prosecution.
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia [1996] ICJ Rep. 595.
20 Ibid., at page 615.
21 Cassese, A. (2003). ‘International Criminal Law.’ Oxford University Press, at page 97.
22 Op. cit. at f.n. 19.
23 With the exception of Eichmann in the District Court of Jerusalem and then the Israeli Supreme 
Court: see case Eichmann, Israel, District Court of Jerusalem, judgment of 12 December 1961, 36 
I.L.R. 5-276.
24 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 1998, UKTS 35 (2002).
25 Lemkin, R. ‘Genocide – A Modern Crime’ (1945) Free World, Vol. 4, pages 39-43.
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Yugoslavia (ICTY)26 and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)27 have both 
provided for the prosecution of individuals accused of genocide despite their limited 
jurisdiction. Akayesu28 was hailed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as: 
A landmark decision in the history of international criminal law that brings to life 
for the first time the ideals of the Genocide Convention adopted over 50 years 
ago.29
Two  days  later  the  decision  in  Kambanda crowned  genocide  as  the  ‘crime  of 
crimes’.30 These  were  followed  by  Kayishema and  Ruzindana31 in  the  ICTR and 
Jelisic32 and Krstic33 in the ICTY.
3. The position of genocide in the international arena.
Genocide  is  considered  to  be  a  ‘peremptory  norm’  or  ‘jus  cogens’,  which  are 
fundamental legal obligations owed by States to all others (erga omnes). Legislating 
for jus cogens is very difficult because of its ad hoc nature. Gardiner believes that jus 
cogens are rules that are ‘blindingly obvious’ and are ‘clearly a part of international 
law’.34 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention attempts to combine  jus cogens with a 
definition:
A peremptory norm is accepted and recognised by the international community of 
States as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only  by  a  subsequent  norm  of  general  international  law  having  the  same 
character...35
A good example of the  ad hoc nature of  jus cogens is provided in the  Nicaragua 
case,36 which described the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article  2, 
paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations to be:
26 ‘Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991’ (International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - ICTY). Genocide is found at Article 4. 
Adopted by Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) on 25 May 1993. See Annex to the Report of the 
Secretary-General pursuant to s. 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN doc. S/25704, 3 
May 1993. Available at www.ohchr.org/english/law/.
27 ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide’ (ICTR). Genocide is found at Article 2. 
See Annex to UN Security Council Resolution (1994) 955, 8 November 1994. Available at 
www.ohchr.org/english/law/.
28 Akayesu, ICTR, Trial Chamber I, Judgment of 2 September 1998, case no. ICTR-96-4-I.
29 UN Information Centre (Pretoria), Statement by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the Occasion 
of the Announcement of the First Judgement in a Case of Genocide by the International Criminal 
Tribunal For Rwanda. UN Doc. PR/10/98/UNIC, 1998.
30 Judgement, Kambanda (ICTR 97-23-S), Trial Chamber I, 4 September 1998, at para. 16.
31 Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, judgment of 21 May 1999, case no. ICTR-95-1-
T, at paras. 41-49.
32 Jelisic, ICTY Trial Chamber I, judgment of 14 December 1999, case no. IT-95-10-T, at paras. 78-83.
33 Krstic, ICTY, Trial Chamber, decision of 2 August 2001, case no. IT-98-33-T, at paras. 539 – 569.
34 See Gardiner, R.K. (2003). ‘International Law’ Pearson, Longman, at page 124.
35 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, at page 331.
36 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of  
America) [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14.
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A  ‘universal  norm’,  a  ‘universal  international  law’,  a  ‘universally  recognized 
principle of international law’, and a ‘principle of jus cogens’.37
The  uncertain  ad  hoc nature  of  jus  cogens does  not  surround genocide  which  is 
considered  to  be  the  ultimate  peremptory  norm.38 In  the  Pinochet case,39 the  UK 
House of Lords held that  jus cogens even trumped a State leaders’ immunity.40 The 
Barcelona Traction case41  was considered during the Pinochet judgement because of 
its logical description of erga omnes:
When a State admits into its territory foreign nationals, it is bound to extend to 
them the protection of the law. The essential distinction should be drawn between 
the obligations  of a State towards the international  community as a whole,  and 
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their 
very nature the former are the concern of all  States…they are obligations  erga 
omnes…42
In  Eichmann,43 it was argued that Israeli law could not punish acts which occurred 
outside its territory because this conflicted with international law and exceeded the 
powers of the Israeli legislature. The Supreme Court of Israel concluded that  erga 
omnes was well established from the times of Grotius44 and in addition, the United 
Nations in an early resolution on genocide had urged its members ‘to enact legislation 
for the prevention and punishment of this crime’.45 Thus it is the movement of people 
on an international scale which invokes the rule of jus cogens in order to protect their 
fundamental interests. Lemkin himself said that the practices of genocide anywhere 
affect the vital interests of all civilised people. Minorities of one sort or another exist 
in  all  countries,  and  if  persecution  of  any  minority  by  any  country  is  tolerated 
anywhere, the very moral and legal foundations of constitutional government may be 
shaken.46 Logically,  just  as Saddam Hussein did not  escape punishment,  President 
Robert Mugabe should not either, no matter where he is found, charged or tried.
4. Distinguishing genocide from crimes against humanity.
37 Ibid., at paragraph 190.
38 ‘The rights and obligations enshrined in the [genocide] convention are rights and obligations erga 
omnes…’  Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia [1993] ICJ Rep. 407, at paragraph 616. On 26 
February 2007 this case was updated on http://www.icj-cij.org. The final judgement – binding without 
leave to appeal – confirmed that the International Courts of Justice had jurisdiction to deal with cases 
under the Genocide Convention, and that Serbia has not committed genocide but had violated its 
obligations to prevent genocide under the Genocide Convention.
39 R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 2 All ER 97; 
[1999] 2 W.L.R. 827; [2000] 1 AC 147.
40 See Lord Hope of Craighead at Ibid.,[2000] 1 AC 147, at page 248.
41 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3.
42 Ibid., at paragraphs 33-34.
43 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann (1968) op. cit. at f.n. 23.
44 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) published ‘On the Laws of War and Peace’ in 1625, identifying ‘just 
causes’ for war, and justice and rules in the conduct of war. Available at 
http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp.htm
45 Resolution 96(I) op. cit. at f.n. 10.
46 Lemkin, R. (1945) loc. cit. at f.n. 25.
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What makes genocide different? Cassese notes that both genocide and crimes against 
humanity share 3 elements: 1) they encompass very serious offences against human 
dignity that shock our sense of humanity; 2) they do not constitute isolated events but 
are instead part of a larger context; 3) they are usually carried out with complicity and 
tolerance  of  the  authorities.47 Interestingly,  in  Kayishema  and  Ruzindana48 the 
majority  of  the  ICTR dismissed  the  charge  of  crimes  against  humanity  as  it  was 
already ‘completely absorbed’ by genocide.49 In Krstic50 the Trial Chamber’s refusal 
to enter convictions for both crimes against humanity and genocide in relation to the 
same  act  was  described by Palombino51 as  ‘manifestly  erroneous’  because  of  the 
relationship  of  reciprocal  speciality existing  between the  two sets  of  crimes.52 In 
reality, genocide is tightly defined so as to disregard imprisonment and torture but to 
include deaths of a collection of people because of their membership of a protected 
group.  And  whereas  both  offences  require  the  intent  to  commit  the  actus  reus, 
genocide also requires a special  intent to destroy,  in whole or in part,  a particular 
group with knowledge of widespread or systematic practice. In addition, there can be 
no reckless genocide.53 Tournaye54 points out that this permits a distinction between 
genocide and war crimes, dispelling the theories that the Vietnam war conducted by 
the Americans amounted to genocide.55 Could a heavy penalty attached to genocide 
also  distinguish  that  crime  from  all  other  crimes?  Not  so:  in  Kayishema  and 
Ruzindana the ICTR Appeals  Chamber  remarked  that  all  of  the crimes  under  the 
ICTR  Statute  are  serious  violations  of  international  humanitarian  law  capable  of 
attracting the same sentence, and genocide - as the ‘crime of crimes’ - does not impact 
on the sentence imposed.56 This seems disappointing, but there is little else that can be 
done.  Akhavan  finds  this  difficult  to  accept,  implying  that  there  is  no  legal 
significance when a ‘general appreciation’ is attached to ‘the pinnacle of evil’.57 Even 
Lemkin saw the evil of genocide as an aggravating factor for punishment: ‘criminal 
intent to kill or destroy all the members of such a group shows premeditation and 
deliberation  and  a  state  of  systematic  criminality  which  is  only  an  aggravated 
circumstance  for  punishment.’58 Whether  from  the  viewpoint  of  retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation, graduated sentencing may be essential for 
distinguishing  between  differing  degrees  of  moral  culpability  in  the  context  of 
47 Cassese, A. (2003). op. cit. at f.n. 21, at page 106.
48 Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, judgment of 21 May 1999, case no. ICTR-95-1-
T, at paras. 41-49.
49 Ibid., at paras. 577-579.
50 Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 33.
51 Palombino, F.M. ‘Notes and Comments: Should Genocide Subsume Crimes Against Humanity?’ 
(2005) I.C.J. 3 3 (778).
52 Ibid., at page 1.
53 This is the ICTR’s interpretation from Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 28, paras. 497, 544-7; Kambanda op. 
cit. at f.n. 30, para. 16; Kayishema and Ruzindana op. cit. at f.n. 48, para. 91; Rutaganda ICTR, Trial 
Chamber, judgment of 6 December 1999, case no. ICTR-96-3-T, para 59; Musema, ICTR, Trial 
Chamber, judgment of 27 January 2000, ICTR-96-13-T, para. 164.
54 Tournaye, C. ‘Shorter Articles, Comments, and Notes Genocidal Intent before the ICTY’ (2003) 
I.C.L.Q. 52 2 (447).
55 The fact that the Americans were aware that their tactics entailed a substantial likelihood of 
destroying a large number of Vietnamese would not meet the level of intent required for genocide. 
Tournaye, C. (2003) Ibid., at page 3.
56 Judgement, Kayishema op. cit. at f.n. 48, at para. 367.
57 Akhavan, P. (2005) ‘Focusing on ICTR Case Law – The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR 
Jurisprudence’ I.C.J. 3 4 (989) at page 6.
58 Lemkin, R. (1946) loc. cit. at f.n. 9.
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genocide. Hanging Saddam Hussein seemed to provide little comfort that he was in 
fact being ‘punished’.
5. The crime of genocide in detail.
Because the Genocide Convention has been adopted into customary international law, 
it  is  correct  to  say  that  the  Convention  has  its  own  actus  reus and  mens  rea. 
‘International criminal responsibility’ is a difficult concept. Can a State carry a legal 
intent? Is it best to separate the individuals from the State and then develop clearly 
defined international crimes and tribunals to try these individuals?59 A breakdown of 
the genocide offence follows below.
5.1. The actus reus of genocide.
Article 2 of the Convention clearly defines the conduct that may amount to genocide: 
a) killing members of a national or ethical, racial or religious group;
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about  
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group;
e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Akayesu60 tightly defined the above list: a) killing is ‘murder’; b) serious bodily and 
mental harm should not necessarily be permanent or irremediable; c) conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction include subjecting a group of people 
to  a  subsistence  diet,61 systematic  expulsion  from  homes,  and  the  reduction  of 
essential  medical  services  below minimum requirements;  d)  measures  intended to 
prevent births within the group consist of sexual mutilation, sterilization, forced birth 
control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages; e) forcibly transferring 
children can include physical and mental measures.62 It can be argued that some of 
these elements only constitute crimes against humanity.
5.2. ‘Group’.
What is meant by ‘group’ in the Convention definition? How are each of the four 
groups (national, ethnical, racial, religious) defined? Is there an objective test? The 
ICTR and the ICTY have intervened on these points. In Akayesu the Trial Chamber of 
the ICTR set out a definition of each group, defining ‘national groups’ as a collection 
of people who are perceived to share a legal bond of common citizenship coupled 
with reciprocity of rights and duties; an ‘ethnic group’ as a group whose members 
share  a  common  language  or  culture;  a  ‘racial  group’  as  a  group  based  on  the 
hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of 
linguistic, cultural,  national or religious factors; and a ‘religious group’ as a group 
whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship. Also, it 
59 Argued by Gardiner, R.K. (2003) op. cit. at f.n. 34, at page 125.
60 Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 28.
61 Argued to be a ‘slow death’ by Akhavan, P. (2005) loc. cit. at f.n. 57, at page 10.
62 Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 28, at paras. 502-509. Lemkin considered the deliberate separation of families 
for depopulation purposes to be genocidal activity in his 1947 work: Lemkin, R. (1947) loc. cit. at f.n. 
11.
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was thought that the groups protected against genocide should not be limited to the 
four  groups  envisaged  in  the  relevant  rules  but  should  include  ‘any  stable  and 
permanent group’. 63 Cassese remains unconvinced, and believes that the framers of 
the Convention explicitly intended only the four groups mentioned to be protected.64 
But how is a group identified? The provisions are very vague.  Akayesu solved this 
problem by noting that in Rwanda the Tutsi constituted a group referred to as ‘ethnic’ 
in official classifications. Because the Tutsi could not be readily distinguished as one 
of the protected groups under the Genocide Convention, the Trial Chambers went to 
great lengths to characterise them as an ‘ethnic’ group in order to justify the label of 
genocide.65 It has to now be established that (i) the victims were in fact treated as 
belonging  to  one  of  the  protected  groups;  and (ii)  they  considered  themselves  as 
belonging to one of such groups. Can we take from this that the test for ‘groups’ is 
both  objective  and  subjective?  Further  mixture  of  objectivity  and  subjectivity 
appeared in Kayishema and Ruzindana where ‘self-identification’ and ‘identification 
by others’  were  considered  to  be  key factors  when identifying  an  ethnic  group.66 
Rutaganda pushed the subjective standard even further by noting that for the purposes 
of  applying  the  Genocide  Convention,  membership  of  a  group  is  a  subjective 
concept.67 The ICTY Trial Chambers shared this subjective approach in Jelisic68 and 
Krstic69.  Akhavan  strongly  condemns  this  approach,  claiming  that  while  a 
constructivist approach to identity is appealing, this solely subjective test leads to a 
theoretical  absurdity.  A  perpetrator  could  define  virtually  any  group  as  ethnic, 
irrespective of its objective attributes,  and be held guilty of genocide.70 Rutaganda 
however was quick to reign-in the subjective test,  concluding that certain groups - 
such as political and economic groups - were excluded from the Convention definition 
because of their  ‘mobile’ status,  suggesting that  the Convention intended to cover 
relatively stable and permanent groups.71 This is a wholly unsatisfactory outcome. Did 
the United Nations when drafting the Genocide Convention intend to turn a blind eye 
to  political  victims?  This  would  allow  President  Robert  Mugabe  slip  through  a 
loophole in the Convention, as his party no doubt act on political motives. Hitler also 
no doubt harboured political reasons for exterminating over one million Jews. Would 
he be able to escape liability under the Genocide Convention?
5.3. ‘In whole or in part’.
How big is a ‘part’? Krstic held that the perpetrator must view the part of the group 
they wish to destroy as a distinct entity.72 All ICTY and ICTR judgements seem to 
have agreed that ‘substantial’ reflects  customary international law. The ‘part’ must 
represent a large number relative to the whole size of the group and the destruction 
must target a qualitatively significant part of the group i.e. the elite part of the group.73 
Geographic location will not indicate whether the targeted group is substantial, but it 
63 Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 28, at paras 512-515.
64 Cassese, A. (2003). op. cit. at f.n. 21, at page 101.
65 Akhavan, P. (2005) op. cit. at f.n. 57, at page 1.
66 Kayishema and Ruzindana, op. cit. at f.n. 48, at para 98.
67 Rutaganda, op. cit. at f.n. 53, at para. 56.
68 Jelisic, op. cit. at f.n. 32, at paras. 70-71.
69 Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 33, at paras. 556 – 560.
70 Akhavan, P. (2005) loc. cit. at f.n. 57, at page 8.
71 Rutaganda op. cit. at f.n. 53, at para 56.
72 Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 33, at paras. 590-597.
73 Jelisic, op. cit. at f.n. 32, at para 82.
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can – in combination with other factors – inform the analysis.74 This seems a little 
vague, but is likely to develop on an ad hoc basis on individual merits.
5.4. The mens rea: evidence; ethnic cleansing; subjectivity.
The mens rea for genocide is provided for very clearly in Article 2 of the Convention, 
which  is  the  intent  to  destroy,  in  whole  or  in  part,  a  national,  ethnical,  racial  or 
religious group. Jorgic described the visions of such a perpetrator: ‘[they] do not see 
the victim as a human being, but only as a member of the persecuted group’.75 Shaw 
notes that States may deny genocide by claiming that the intent to destroy a group in 
whole  or  in  part  was  in  fact  absent.76 Akayesu stated  that  intention  is  almost 
impossible to determine, and so in the absence of a confession from the accused, his 
intent can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact.77 What evidence 
would  be  required  for  this?  In  reality,  the  isolated  killing  of  five  members  of  a 
religious group with the required intention could amount to genocide. The ICTY in 
Krstic considered evidence relating to the cultural or social destruction of a group in 
relation to implying intention, despite only physical and biological genocide coming 
within the ambit of the Convention, and held that physical or biological destruction is 
often coupled with simultaneous attacks on the cultural  and religious property and 
symbols of the targeted group, and these attacks may be considered as evidence of an 
intent  to  physically  destroy  the  group.78 Perhaps  ‘widespread’  and  ‘systematic’ 
practices  may  take  a  more  evidential  standpoint  in  cases  to  come  to  aid  the 
verification of the required mens rea. This, of course, means that ethnic cleansing is 
not to be considered as an act of genocide, but rather an act from which genocidal 
intent  can be inferred.  Ethnic cleansing is not provided for under Article 2 of the 
genocide  Convention,79 and  the  ICTY  has  refused  to  label  ethnic  cleansing  as 
genocide.80 Vuckovic established that ‘the forced expulsion of a population with an 
acceptance  that  a  consequence  may  be  death’  does  not  characterise  the  intent  to 
destroy an ethnic group in whole or in part.81 This is a wise decision: the ICTY is 
bound to reflect the state of customary international law under the principle in dubio 
pro  reo.82 In  other  cases  however,  ‘ethnic  cleansing’  has  been  characterised  as 
74 Krstic op. cit. at f.n. 33, at para 13.
75 Jorgic, Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 30th April 1999, at para. 401. See also 
12th December 2000 and the judgment of 26 September 1997 in 3 Strafrecht 215/98. On-line at 
www.bverf.de.
76 Shaw, M.N. (2003). ‘International Law’ 5th Edition. Cambridge University Press, at page 263.
77 Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 28, at para. 523.
78 Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 33, at para. 580; and Karadzic and Mladic, (Review of the Indictment pursuant 
to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) ICTY, Trial Chamber, decision of 11 July 1996, 
case no. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, at para 94.
79 During drafting, Syria proposed a sixth class of acts of genocide: ‘imposing measures intended to 
oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the threat of subsequent ill-
treatment’. This was rejected: UN Doc. A/C6/234.
80 Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 33, at para 580; Jelisic, op. cit. at f.n. 32, at paras 78-83. However, The United 
Nations General Assembly has previously labelled ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide: UN Doc 
AG/Res./47/121 of 18 Dec 1992.
81 Vuckovic, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Supreme Court of Kosovo, decision of 31 August 2001, 
AP.156/2001, at paras 2-3. See also Kusljic, Germany, Federal Higher Court of Justice, judgment of 21 
February 2001, 3 StR 244/00, at paras 7-10.
82 The Prosecutor v Delalic IT-96-21-T (16 Nov 1998), para 413: ‘where an equivocal word or 
ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning which canons of construction fail to 
solve, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject and against the legislature which has 
failed to explain this.’
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genocide. For example, Judge Riad in  Karadzic and Mladic held that such a policy 
can  aim  to  create  new  borders  by  violently  changing  the  national  or  religious 
composition of the population. Therefore, the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ presents in 
its ultimate manifestation genocidal characteristics.83 Interestingly, Krstic held that by 
killing all the military aged men, the Bosnian Serb forces eliminated all likelihood 
that they could ever re-establish themselves on that territory.84 Physical disappearance 
from Srebrenica does not amount to physical destruction of the group as such, so did 
the Chamber flirt with the notion of cultural genocide by treating the combination of 
the massacres and the forcible transfer as the destruction of the group?85 It must be 
noted that Lemkin did not limit genocide to physical destruction but suggested many 
forms  of  genocide  including  political,  social,  cultural,  language,  national  feeling, 
religious,  economic,  personal  security,  liberty,  health,  and  dignity.86 But  it  is 
suggested that Lemkin’s proposals from 1944 should be read in context.  Lemkin’s 
endeavour was to criminalise any wrongful act committed against members of a group 
out of hatred towards this particular group covering  all wrongful acts motivated by 
discrimination.87
5.5. The mens rea: dolus specialis.
The  Jorgic case made reference to an aggravated intention,  one which is required 
above and beyond the requisite mens rea under Article 2, otherwise known as dolus  
specialis. Triffterer defines this additional requirement very clearly: ‘…there are two 
subjective  elements  required  to  establish  criminal  responsibility  for  genocide:  the 
mens rea, as pendant to the actus reus, and the ‘intent to destroy’…the two intents 
ought to be strictly separated when it comes to prove the facts necessary to establish 
the innocence or guilt of an accused.’88 Dolus Specialis applies to all material acts of 
genocide enumerated under Article 2(a)-(e) of the Statute. This special intent requires 
that  the  perpetrator  ‘clearly  intended the result’  signifying  ‘a  psychological  nexus 
between  the  physical  result  and the  mental  state  of  the  perpetrator’.89 This  dolus 
specialis can be deduced from the circumstances  of an attack carried out under  a 
structurally organized control on the group of which the culprit is aware and which he 
wills.90 Akayesu may have confused this with general intent,  as the Trial  Chamber 
held that the offender is culpable because he knew or should have known that the act 
committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group.91 We must be careful not to 
include  recklessness  into  the  Convention  definition,  as  this  would  soften  the  evil 
element  which  distinguishes  genocide  from all  other  crimes.  A perhaps  too  strict 
judgement can be found in Jelisic,  where the defendant could not be found guilty of 
genocide because he killed arbitrarily. It had not been proved beyond all reasonable 
doubt  that  the  accused  was  motivated  by  the  dolus  specialis of  the  crime  of 
83 Karadzic and Mladic op. cit. at f.n. 78, at para 94.
84 Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 33, at paras. 590-597.
85 Tournaye, C. (2003) loc. cit. at f.n. 54, at page 9.
86 Lemkin, R. (1944) loc. cit. at f.n. 2. A more detailed list appeared later in Lemkin, R. (1945) loc. cit. 
at f.n. 25.
87 Tournaye, C. (2003) loc. cit. at f.n. 54, at page 5.
88 Triffterer, O. ‘Genocide, its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such’ 
(2001) Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 14, No. 2, 400.
89 Musema op. cit. at f.n. 53, at paras. 164 and 166.
90 See Jorgic, Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 30th April 1999, at paras 19-22. op.  
cit. at f.n. 75.
91 Akayesu op. cit. at f.n. 28, at para 520.
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genocide.92 Jelisic may be accused of narrowing the law. Perhaps  Jorgic is a better 
alternative, where systematic expulsion can be an indication of the required intent. 
The concept of an aggravated intention however leads to a clearer distinction between 
genocide, murder, and other crimes against humanity. 93 
6. Intending genocide in today’s international climate.  
The application of genocide has been problematic in other areas. Eboe-Osuji94 notes 
that the two Tribunals (ICTR and ICTY) have shown some difficulty in distinguishing 
‘complicity  in  genocide’  in  Article  2(3)(e)  of  the  ICTR  Statute  and  ‘aiding  and 
abetting genocide’ under Article 6(1) of the ICTY Statute. He proposes that they are 
in fact distinguishable from one another as a result of Akayesu, which noted that for 
aiding and abetting under Article 6(1) there is a requirement for a special mens rea to 
destroy the targeted group in whole or in part, and that complicity in genocide does 
not require this special  mens rea: all that is required is the knowledge on the part of 
the accused that  he is  assisting a  genocidal  enterprise.95 Krstic offered a  different 
approach to the problem, and simply saw an overlap between the two provisions: 
The drafters of the Statute ensured that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over all forms 
of  participation  in  genocide…the consequence of this  approach…is that  certain 
heads of individual criminal responsibility overlap.96
Semanza went one step further and declared a state of redundancy between the two 
concepts  within  the  ICTR Statute.97 The  Krstic-Semanza approach  contradicts  the 
maxim  ut res magis valeat  quam pereat,  which encourages  judges to explore any 
avenue of statutory construction to give effect and meaning to the problematic statute 
rather than declare a redundancy. Can President Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF Party be 
said to be aiding his genocide? Akayesu is not without its critics. The Trial Chamber 
in  Stakic98 noted with respect to aiding, abetting, planning, preparing and executing 
genocide,  the distinction  in  Akayesu was ‘not  sustainable  in law’ because specific 
genocidal  intent  was  required  for  each  mode  of  participation.99 There  are  other 
problems with Akayesu.  Great contradictions lie within the judgement.100 Eboe-Osuji 
remarks that the great weakness of Akayesu was its focus on mens rea as the pivotal 
point  of  distinction  between  complicity  and  aiding  and abetting  genocide.101 This 
reliance runs against the current jurisprudence of the Tribunals. The requisite  mens 
rea should be derived from the act of participation coupled with the knowledge that it 
will assist the principal in the commission of the criminal act.102 Professor Schabas 
strongly maintains that an accomplice to genocide must have the intent to destroy in 
92 Jelisic, op. cit. at f.n. 32, at paras. 107-108.
93 Kayishema op. cit, at f.n. 48, at para. 91.
94 Eboe-Osuji, C. ‘”Complicity in Genocide” versus “Aiding and Abetting Genocide” – Construing the  
Difference in the ICTR and ICTY Statutes’ (2005) I.C.J. 3 1 (56), at page 1.
95 Akayesu op. cit. at f.n. 28, at paras. 485, 540 and 544-548.
96 Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 33, at para. 640. 
97 Semanza , ICTR, Trial Chamber III, Judgment of 15 May 2003, case no. ICTR-97-20-T, at para. 394.
98 Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, Stakic (IT-97-24-T), Trial Chamber II, 31 October 2002.
99 Ibid., at para. 60.
100 For example, contrast ‘an accused is liable as an accomplice to genocide…even though the accused 
himself did not have the specific intent’ at para 545 to ‘it must be proven that such a person acted with 
specific genocidal intent’ at para 547.
101 Eboe-Osuji, C. (2005) loc. cit. at f.n. 94, at page 4.
102 Kayishema and Ruzindana op. cit. at f.n. 48, at para. 186.
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whole or in part  a  national,  racial,  ethnical  or religious  group in accordance with 
Article 2 of the Genocide Convention,103 but English legal authority contradicts this 
stance holding the view that accessories only need to intend to assist the principal, 
knowing  that  the  principal  was  contemplating  to  commit  a  crime.104 Besides,  the 
intention  which  Professor  Schabas  supports  under  Article  2  of  the  Genocide 
Convention only adheres to the act of genocide itself. There is an absence of clear 
statutory language for the  mens rea of complicity under Article 2(3)(e) ICTR, and 
indeed any other participatory mode in relation to genocide. It may simply depend on 
the domestic legislation enforced.
   The  personal  motive  of  the  perpetrator  does  not  count  towards  a  genocide 
conviction and does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent 
to commit genocide. An intent to physically destroy a group, in whole or in part, to 
gain a piece of land, for instance, would not be sufficient to make the intended mass 
destruction genocidal. Victims must be chosen by reason of their membership in the 
group  whose  destruction  was  sought.105 In  Kupreskic the  victims  were  targeted 
because of such belonging. What matters is the intent to attack persons on account of 
their ethnic, racial,  or religious characteristics.106 This however is difficult to prove 
and easy to deny. Saddam Hussein strongly denied that he was guilty of genocide 
throughout his entire trial, and it is said with confidence that when President Robert 
Mugabe is  finally  brought  to  justice,  he will  deny the  slaughtering  and deaths  in 
Zimbabwe to the very end.
7. Conclusion.
There have been times, particularly as a result of the creation of the ICTY and the 
ICTR, where the response to genocide has been re-active rather than pro-active. It is 
submitted  though  that  this  is  the  nature  of  the  crime,  because  genocide  is  only 
identifiable when the physical effects of the crime begin to show. By the time targeted 
ethnic or religious groups are separated,  or broadcasts appear from hate-groups, or 
armies are trained and equipped, the intent to commit genocide on the part of the 
perpetrator has probably been rooted and manifesting for some time. A very large 
international  organisation of any kind cannot  bring to account  the individual  (and 
somewhat  hidden)  cause  of  this  problem until  it  is wildly  exhibited,  which  is  a 
regretful part of genocide which we may have to accept. 
     The possibility of an International Criminal Court conviction is ruled out if a 
country who commits  genocide  has  not  accepted  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  In 
addition,  because  the  statutes  and case  law surrounding genocide  are  so vague,  a 
successful conviction cannot move forward until the quagmire of ill-defined statutory 
definitions and requisite intentions has been waded through. President Robert Mugabe 
faces  almost  daily  global  criticism.  At  the  time  of  writing,  the  results  of  the 
presidential poll in Zimbabwe had not been announced after a two month delay, amid 
claims of violence at the hands of his political party.  Most people saw the trial of 
Saddam Hussein and his defiance against the judge and the Court which tried him. It 
103 Schabas, H. (2000). ‘Genocide in International Law: The mens rea of Complicity.’ Cambridge 
University Press, at page 300.
104 The strong authorities are: Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 K.B. 544, at pages 546-547; Wilcox v Jeffery 
[1951] 1 All E.R. 464; National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 Q.B. 11, at pages 18-20; and Maxwell  
v Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland [1979] 68 Cr.App.R. 128, per Sir Robert 
Lowry, at page 137.
105 Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 33, at para 561.
106 The Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic IT-95-16-T (14 Jan 2000), at para 636.
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did not feel, from an observer’s standpoint, that he was being punished for the deaths 
of many. On the face of it, he received the same treatment, the same trial and the same 
penalty as what the next man would have received for the death of one victim. What 
is difficult to accept, is that we can not offer a greater punishment for the crime of 
genocide than we can for the killing of one man. Perhaps the fall from grace will be 
greater for the defendant, but what respite does that bring for the victims and their 
families,  of  which  where  may  be  many  thousands?  Despite  the  efforts  of  the 
international  community,  the  crime  of  genocide  is  so evil  that  it  could  never be 
punished appropriately.
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